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Abstract
Growing out of the labor militancy and political radicalism of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the revolutionary union Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) grew to be one
of the most radical working-class movements in American history, containing 150,000 members
during its peak in 1917. However, by its sixteenth convention in 1924, the union nearly
collapsed beneath the weight of state repression, vigilante killings, organizational weaknesses,
and political divisions, after which it remained on the fringes of labor politics. Many authors of
varying backgrounds and decades have sought to explain the decline of the IWW, emphasizing
either repression, internal organization, or political and programmatic questions as the
fundamental cause. Through a historiographic review of scholarly and descriptive works, I argue
for a more critical approach to the popularized focus on state repression, while highlighting the
underrated value of organizational and political arguments. In doing so, I seek to strengthen not
only the historical understanding of the IWW, but offer a fresh perspective on working-class
politics, social movement history, and the American history in which the IWW is a part.

2
Introduction
Given the relatively low levels of strike activity in the past few decades, one might be
surprised to learn of the militancy that characterized working-class struggles in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a period in which the industrial working class
grew in size amid the flourishing of American capitalism, the rise of overseas imperialism, world
war, and demographic shifts rooted in a large influx of immigrants, Mexican-Americans, and
Southern blacks migrating to northern and midwestern cities. Hundreds of thousands of factory
workers, miners, longshoremen and other workers of diverse skill levels risked their jobs and
sometimes lives to strike, rally, and demonstrate against companies and government
administrations in the interests of decent working and living conditions.
In 1905, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) arose as an organized revolutionary
labor movement, building upon the prior years of workplace militancy and radical politics that
characterized the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), American Labor Union, and Socialist
Party. The IWW grew into a large-scale labor and social movement, with up to 150,000
members or “Wobblies” by 1917, with the most radical program of any mass labor organization
in American history. “Between these two classes [the working class and capitalist class],” the
militants stated in the preamble to their 1905 constitution, “a struggle must go on until all the
toilers come together on the political, as well as on the industrial field, and take and hold that
which they produce by their labor, through an economic organization of the working class1
without affiliation with any political party.”2 Advancing an American-style syndicalism, the

1

According to the IWW definition, which aligns with Marxist economic theory, the “working class” is a
social group that is bound in “wage slavery”, forced to sell its labor to employers for a wage, while the
“employing class” acquires profits and wealth. The divisions between the working class by trade, region,
nation, gender, and ethnicity are seen by the IWW as arbitrary, enforced by the employing class for
repressive purposes.
2
Industrial Workers of the World, “The Original I.W.W. Preamble,” General Website (2018).
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Wobblies refused to sign negotiated contracts, opting instead for militant direct action to
sabotage both the public-sector and private bosses. Even with the financial difficulties, political
disagreements,

state

repression,

and

interpersonal

conflicts present throughout the

organization’s life, the IWW successfully organized workers in specific industries, such as
timber, mining, agriculture, and shipping ports, mostly in the Western region of the United States
where free-spirited migratory and immigrant workers made up the majority of the labor force.
However, the organization underwent a transition after its mountainous peak in 1917,
when its successes did not last. Facing a number of difficulties associated with the changing
post-war economy, ramped up state repression during the Palmer Raids and First Red Scare,
and various internal political and organizational conflicts, the Wobblies came under immense
pressure. By the time of their Fifteenth Annual Convention in the summer of 1924, the “One Big
Union” had become fragmented, divided, and lacked the tried and true leaders of the former
period. The convention proved to be a turning point, marking the collapse of the once-massive
organization into a small group of “old guard” radicals who existed on the fringes of mainstream
left-wing politics and industrial trade unionism. While the organization exists today, and has
actually grown in the past two years through small-scale unionization efforts in the Pacific
Northwest,3 new members relate to the early struggles only through historical archives. Today’s
Wobblies focus more on ecological and anarchistic activism and local unionism than the
industry-wide revolutionary syndicalism of the movement’s founding.
The rapid collapse of such a large and significant movement in American social history
strikes my interest. A wealth of historical material exists on the booming period of the IWW

3

After largely failed unionization efforts in the past decade, the Wobblies launched the Burgerville
Workers Union in 2018 and Little Big Union in 2019 in Portland, Oregon, with other success across the
food and service industries. For an overview, see Teke Wiggins, “The Food Industry Has Been
Notoriously Hard to Organize,” Huffington Post (October 9, 2018).
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between its founding in 1905 and defense campaigns in 1919.4 In contrast, the drastic decline of
the mass revolutionary workers’ organization has received scant attention. The relative lack of
engagement with the collapse of the movement reflects an understandable intrigue with the
positive and romantic side of radical politics, perhaps especially so since most IWW historians
are either sympathetic to the organization or to social movements in general. Of the histories
and analyses of the IWW’s decline that do exist, the notable works are separated from one
another over nearly a hundred years, scattered in a handful of comprehensive works,5 brief
chapters of larger works that cover either the IWW’s activities before 19176 or include the IWW
as part of broader themes on social movements,7 and political essays by left-wing activists.8
Authors have explained the decline of the IWW as a product of interacting factors. These
include the jailing or murder of its leadership by company security forces and government
agents, state censorship and raids, the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution and growth of the
Communist Party, the strengthening of other less-radical forms of trade unionism, organizational
weakness, financial difficulties, and broader changes in the global post-war economy that led to
the stagnation of wages and working conditions. Because of the long periods separating
existing scholarship, along with the wide assortment of authors involved, there does not yet
exist a comprehensive review of the IWW’s decline. Further, the popularized narrative that the

Notable sources include John Graham Brooks, American Syndicalism: The IWW (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1913); Paul Brissenden, The IWW: A study of American syndicalism (Russel &
Russel, 1920); Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World
(University of Illinois Press, 1993); James Gregory & Conor Casey, The IWW History Project (University
of Washington, 2019); Robert L. Tyler, Rebels of the Woods: The IWW in the Pacific Northwest (Oregon
State University Press, 1967); Fred Thompson & Patrick Murfin, The IWW, Its First Seventy Years,
1905-1975 (Chicago: Industrial Workers of the World, 1978).
5
John Gambs, The Decline of the I.W.W. (Columbia University Press, 1932); Leland Robinson, Social
Movement Organizations in Decline: A Case Study of the IWW (Northeastern University, 1973).
6
Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 461-66.
7
Robert Goldberg, “One Big Union: The Industrial Workers of the World,” Grassroots Resistance:
Socialist Movements in the 20th Century (1990); Kenyon Zimmer, “Premature anti-communists?
American Anarchism, the Russian Revolution, and Left-Wing Libertarian Anti-Communism, 1917-1939,”
Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas (2009).
8
Cannon, James P. “The I.W.W.,” Fourth International (1955).
4
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movement’s collapse is rooted primarily in state repression contradicts the majority of historical
contributions that portray repression as a pressure, which merely exacerbated more
fundamental internal organizational or programmatic tensions.
I aim to provide an integrated explanation of the Wobblies collapse through the methods
of historiography, with which I bring distanced historical works into communication with each
other, account for the different explanations of the IWW’s decline with regards to the
backgrounds of authors and the respective eras in which they worked, and suggest new
conclusions on the subject that arise from their findings. Through a historical review of scholarly
and descriptive works across decades and varying perspectives, I argue for a more critical
approach to the popularized explanation of state repression as the fundamental factor in the
decline of the IWW after 1917. In doing so, I seek to strengthen the historical understanding of
the IWW, which may lend a fresh perspective to broader fields of working-class politics and
social movement history.
The first section of this thesis essay provides the historical background to the key events
and broader context in which the decline of the IWW developed. It includes descriptive material
that repeatedly appears in the secondary works under historiographic analysis. The essay then
proceeds to summarize how the ten authors explain why these events took place, organizing
this material into three groups by the fundamental reason each sees behind the decline. Based
on these categories, the second section examines works emphasizing state and cultural
repression, the third section includes works that focus on internal organizational weaknesses,
and the fourth section explores works that stress the programmatic questions that related to
communism, anarchism and trade unionism. Additionally, this section examines what seem to
be the motivating factors behind the author’s narratives. A final segment offers suggestions on

6
the implications of the historiographic analysis, and what it may mean for the way we
understand the decline of the IWW and social movements more broadly.

Historical Context and Wobbly Life
After years of geopolitical tensions and economic instability, the First World War officially
started on July 28, 1914. That date marked a turning point in world history, producing mass
casualties and social instability that galvanized political radicalism, labor struggles, and
movement-building of wide layers of the working class and exploited people around the world. In
the midst of the war-time period, the revolutionary waves that swept across much of Europe
found expression in the United States as well.9 Elements of the American working class
launched rebellions of its own, organized in unions and left-wing parties that had been growing
since the late nineteenth century. Notable strikes include those by five thousand copper miners
in Arizona in January 1916, sixteen thousand steelworkers in Youngstown, Ohio in 1915,
thousands of Standard Oil workers in New Jersey in both 1915 and 1916, and New York City
transit workers in 1916. Corresponding with the rise of large-scale strikes, the two decades
following the turn of the century witnessed a surge in progressive, radical and anti-war politics.
The Socialist Party, which was formed in 1901 and overlapped slightly with Wobbly
membership, expanded its influence through unions and elections, obtaining over 900,000 votes
for famed candidate Eugene Debs in 1912 and 1920.

9

For further reading on labor militancy, radical politics and anti-war movements in the early twentieth
century, see Philip Foner, “Labor and World War I, 1914-1918,” History of the Labor Movement in the
United States, Vol. 7 (International Publishers, 1987); Jack Ross, The Socialist Party of America: A
Complete History (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2015), 58-236; Michael Kazin, War Against War: The
American Fight for Peace, 1914-1918 (Simon and Schuster, 2017); Neil Hamilton, Rebels and
Renegades: A Chronology of Social and Political Dissent in the United States (Routledge, 2002),
133-198; Palmer, Bryan D. Palmer, James P. Cannon and the origins of the American revolutionary left,
1890-1928, (University of Illinois Press, 2007).
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In the first two decades of the twentieth century, a period of progressive politics and
labor militancy in the United States and internationally, the Industrial Workers of the World
(IWW) stood out as the most radical of the mass labor organizations to which many workers
committed themselves.10 One of the largest unions at the time was the American Federation of
Labor (AFL), which grew under the presidency of Samuel Gompers from 50,000 members in
1886 to around 3 million in 1924.11 Unlike the AFL, which leveraged relations with the state and
compromised with big business to win major concessions,12 the IWW relentlessly opposed
World War One as an imperialist venture along with the left-wing of the Socialist Party and the
anti-war coalition. Whereas the AFL prohibited minority workers, women and unskilled workers
from organizing alongside with their counterparts, the IWW sought to unify workers across
divisions of gender, race, nationality and occupation in militant struggles for improvements in
working and living conditions that did not accept friendly compromise with the bosses. The
tensions between the radical and conservative unions sharpened in 1914 to such a degree that
the AFL unofficially coordinated with the U.S. establishment to support the war effort and help
“crush radical labor groups” like the IWW and Socialist Party.13
Though the IWW never achieved the million-strong unions of the AFL, membership in its
“One Big Union” peaked at more than 150,000 in 1917.14 Labor militancy during World War One
culminated in general strikes along the West Coast and other major port cities by 1919,
including the Seattle General Strike in early February. Miners, longshoremen, lumber workers
and agricultural workers were among the most radical sectors of the working class, in part due

10

Though most widely known as a distinctly American working-class and political movement, the
Wobblies were active in other countries, such as Britain, Australia and South Africa. See Peter Cole,
Wobblies of the World: A Global History of the IWW (London: Pluto Press, 2017).
11
AFL-CIO. “Samuel Gompers”, Key People in Labor History (2019).
12
Concessions won through Gompers’ pragmatic strategy included better wages, an eight-hour work day,
equal pay for women, a role on wartime government commissions, and collective bargaining rights.
13
Robert J. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present ( Cambridge,
1978), 121.
14
Goldberg, “One Big Union,” 62.

8
to their isolated, ethnically-diverse, and migratory position in society. Thus, these segments
composed the bulk of active IWW locals. Through its largest labor actions in Arizona, Chicago,
and Oregon, as well as its famous free speech fights in California, Montana, and Washington
state, the Wobblies garnered a reputation for its militant workplace efforts and distinct cultural
artifacts.15 Many of its founders and leading members became recognized as icons in organized
labor and left-wing politics, including Eugene Debs, William “Big Bill” Haywood, Daniel DeLeon,
Vincent St. John, Lucy Parsons, Mary “Mother” Jones, James Connelly, Thomas Hagerty, Joe
Hill, John Reed, James P. Cannon, and Frank Little.
In popular accounts, the first twelve years of the IWW are often romanticized as a period
of linear growth in strength, numbers, and successes. However, the organization faced a great
deal of conflict from within and outside its ranks. During the founding convention in 1905,
members engaged in heated discussion over the programmatic foundations upon which the
IWW would be built, drawing lines that would persist over the course of their lives. During high
and low points, the Wobblies were divided in the camps of Marxian and reformist socialists,
anarchists, and conservative unionists and industrial militants. “They all believed in the
‘irrepressible conflict’ between capital and labor. They were a unit in wishing for and aiming at
the overthrow of the wages system--the downfall of capitalism,” wrote Paul Brissenden in The
IWW: A Study of American Syndicalism, but, “as usual, there was disagreement as to the
methods to be used to reach the common end desired.”16 These disagreements at times led to
intense debates, the expulsion of members, and the shutting down of some locals, projects, and
publications.

15

Wobblies have historically been known for their songs and parodies of religious hymns, around which
members formed bonding rituals. See a modern expansion of the original “Little Red Songbook” in Archie
Green, The Big Red Songbook: 250 IWW Songs! (C.H. Kerr Company, 2016).
16
Brissenden, The IWW, 77.
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However many issues existed internally, government officials and business interests
viewed the IWW as a potential threat to wartime industrial mobilization. Indeed, the movement
faced severe repression by government bodies, police, the courts, major newspapers, and
religious institutions. The work of Foner and Dubofsky in particular reveal how capitalist interests
utilized the IWW, as well as other historically militant unions like the WFM, as a scapegoat to
hide worsening social tensions between capital and labor. Rarely did the IWW unionize the
majority of workers within an industry or city, but their tactics and views of the world resonated
deeply with workers, in a way that arguably encouraged the use of industrial solidarity and
militant direct action. This form of working-class resistance posed a threat to the profit interests
of the companies and nation-state interests pursued by the United States in World War One, as
the Wobblies sought to sabotage the war effort with strikes in logging and shipyard industries
that were critical to military operations. At times, the government exhibited wartime paranoia and
xenophobia, accusing the Wobblies of being agents of the German government or as Bolshevik
revolutionaries aiming to violently destroy the foundations of American society.
Facing anti-union and anti-radical repression since its inception, the Wobblies suffered
from stepped up state attacks during WWI that included arrests, imprisonment, murder,
censorship of publications, criminalization of activity and membership, and raids on their
physical centers. The federal Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918 legally embodied
state repression of political and union activity. By 1919, Wobbly leaders such as William “Big
Bill” Haywood, Vincent St. John, James P. Cannon, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Frank Little had
been imprisoned by police or murdered by vigilante action. In addition, hundreds were targeted
during and immediately after World War One. Agents of the Bureau of Investigation17 raided
every IWW office in the country on September 5, 1917. In 1918, the government charged over

17

Predecessor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
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one hundred members with over 10,000 violations of federal law in the Chicago Wobbly Mass
Trial.18 Many major acts of repression occurred outside an official legal framework, as in the
Centralia Tragedy of 1919, during which six people died and many more were injured or
arrested after a standoff between American Legion vigilantes and Wobblies at an Armistice Day
parade in 1919. During this period, many of those locked away or dead due to repression were
essential to the day-to-day operations of the organization, as well as leading the membership
with inspirational energy. Having lost its most significant and active members, large quantities of
literature and material assets, and dues from increased competition by company unions after
the war, the organization came under immense pressure. In the years that followed 1917, the
remaining members focused on defense campaigns to raise funds to bail out the “class war
prisoners” and rebuild the financially-weak organization.
Aggregating after an abnormal break in national meetings, the IWW nearly collapsed at
the 1924 convention. The organization confronted two immediate sparks that set off the mortal
flames. The first was the tension between sections of the movement, which reached new levels
between 1922 and 1923 regarding how certain locals responded to new events. After years of
defense campaigns that resulted in minimal successes, newly-elected President Warren
Harding commuted the sentences of eleven Wobblies in December 1922 on the condition they
withdrew their union membership. He subsequently offered to commute the sentences of most
remaining prisoners if they agreed to “remain law-abiding and in no way to encourage
law-breaking.”19 Those who had accepted the offer were rejected by the bulk of the membership
and remaining prisoners, whose sentences were commuted by President Calvin Coolidge in
December 1923 under terms deemed more principled. Criticism of the handling of the

Steven Parfitt, “The Justice Department Campaign Against the IWW, 1917-1920”, The IWW History
Project (University of Washington, 2015).
19
Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 263.
18
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commutation stemmed from the Harding’s characterization of the union’s “law-breaking” ways,
when the IWW loyalists historically defended their basic democratic and legal rights as a
political-labor organization. After these events, the majority of members carried a distrust of
significant leaders, such as Ralph Chaplin, and led bitter factional arguments within their
publications and internal meetings.
This major organizational controversy was soon accompanied by a second, regarding
the mandatory dues increases issued by a Philadelphia local. Technically, the decision of local
leadership violated the constitutional limits on dues, but the local leaders continuously justified
the increases by citing higher operation costs. Though the events focused on questions of
strategy and finances, disaffected members took these issues to represent a centralist,
bureaucratic trajectory within the executive leadership that conflicted with anarchistic tenets.
Thirdly, the IWW confronted heavy political pressure by the Communist International
(Comintern) after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. In January 1920, the Executive Committee
of the Comintern issued a letter to the IWW, inviting them to join the international communist
movement’s labor wing, the Red International of Labor Unions. “We address this letter to you,
fellow-workers of the I.W.W., in recognition of your long and heroic service in the class war, of
which you have borne the brunt in your own country, so that you may clearly understand our
Communist principles and programme. We appeal to you,” the Executive Committee introduced,
“as revolutionists, to rally to the Communist Internationale, born in the dawn of the World Social
Revolution.”20 While the letter sought to directly address the long-standing concerns held by
IWW members of the authoritarian, bureaucratic potential of the Bolsheviks, it prompted a
division within the Wobblies over how to respond. Amid the heated debates at annual leadership
and membership events, George Williams waged a vocal campaign against the Comintern,

20

Central Executive Committee of the Communist International, “To the I.W.W., A Special Message from
the Communist International,” (1920).
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arguing, as Dubofsky writes, that “a communist takeover would leave the Wobblies with neither
an organization nor principles.”21 In the end, the IWW general executive board took to the
argument and voted against entry into the Comintern’s labor wing in 1922. “The history of
American unionism testifies to the destructive influence of labor politics and politicians,” the
leaders wrote to justify their decision.22
These two sets of problems at the 1924 convention embroiled delegates over both the
political and organizational disagreements.23 To aggravate matters, two disputing factions of
union leadership had scheduled two separate sessions for members to choose between. The
first consisted of the long-standing elected leadership, represented by Tom Doyle and Joe
Fisher; and the second was comprised of anti-leadership members led by James Rowan and M.
Raddock. On the fifth day of separate meetings, bitter conflicts, and suggestions for breaking up
the organization, delegates voted to suspend the IWW’s entire national leadership, including
most of the general executive board and the Lumber Workers’ union, the IWW’s largest affiliate.
After legal battles over which faction would control of the union’s declining assets and dwindling
membership, the Rowan faction became the official IWW, drafting its own “Emergency
Program”.24 Long-time leaders like Richard Brazier and Forrest Edwards drifted away, as did the
majority of the membership. As business unions, some AFL sections, and the Communist Party
fared much better in the 1920s than the IWW, most members did not feel compelled to commit
themselves to saving either faction within their own movement and, in the words of Fred
Thompson, “dropped out the middle.”25

Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 264.
Ibid. For the minority pro-Soviet view, see Harrison George, The Red Dawn: The Bolsheviki and the
IWW (Chicago: I.W.W. Publishing Bureau, 1918).
23
Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 263-5.
24
John Gambs, The Decline of the I.W.W., 100.
25
Fred Thompson and Patrick Murfin, The IWW, 151.
21
22
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Scholars generally agree upon the 1924 convention as the final turning point, the marker
of collapse after years of degeneration. Rowan’s official continuation of the IWW struggled to
keep members and locals around, as many flocked to either mainstream unions or more defined
political tendencies, like communism or anarchism. Many of its own members and leaders, such
as James P. Cannon, had joined the Communist movement as it attracted rising numbers of
radical workers after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, albeit with its own rocky start full of splits
and divisions.26 While the IWW led the Colorado Miners Strike in 1927, among other working
class struggles in the Twenties,27 the movement fell into the fringes of labor activity and
progressive politics. During the 1930s, other industrial unions, the largest being the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO), prospered amid the Great Depression and gained support from
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.28 By the start of the Second World War in 1939, the
IWW had dwindled to little more than a small union scattered in a handful of cities.
The IWW maintained its organization with what was left of the old and demoralized
leadership, issuing statements against capitalism, fascism, and Communism.29 Today, they
operate

in

small-scale

unions

mostly

in

the

Pacific

Northwest,

focusing

on

occasionally-successful local efforts to organize the service industry, participate in anti-fascist
demonstrations, and promote environmental politics. After years of failed attempts to unionize
fast food restaurants and small businesses, the Wobblies have grown their membership through
fast-food unions at Burgerville and Little Big Burger in Oregon, with their largest national branch
in Seattle, Washington. The Burgerville Workers Union is the first fast-food union recognized by

Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United States: From the Depression to WWII (Rutgers
University Press, 1991), 9.
27
For accounts of IWW activity in the 1920s, see Charles Bayard, “The 1927-1928 Colorado Coal Strike,”
Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 32, No. 3. (1963); Robert E. Ficken, “The Wobbly Horrors: Pacific
Northwest Lumbermen and the Industrial Workers of the World, 1917-1928,” Labor History (1983),
325-41; Fred Thompson and Patrick Murfin, The IWW.
28
For one example of how industrial unionism spread beyond the IWW, see Lizabeth Cohen, Making a
New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
29
Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, 464.
26
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the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and thus has the ability to negotiate contracts with
employers and other traits of mainstream unions. While retaining the logo, red cards, and
historical documents of 1905, the Wobblies of today are too anarchistic, parochial, and “pure
and simple” unionist in character to be considered a direct extension of their century-old
founders.

Perspectives on State Repression: The Pessimistic Minority
For an organization to transform so drastically, its story is bound to be complex,
protracted, and full. The IWW endured many experiences between its peak in 1917 and its
latest adventures today, over the course of decades in which the world around it changed as
well. Contrary to the complexity that should be expected, the popular official histories paint a
straightforward picture. According to these narratives, it arose from radical ashes and carried
out impressive work with brave leaders, but unfortunately, the repressive forces of the state and
corporations achieved their aims of smothering the movement into practical non-existence, set
aside the past two years. State repression lay at the heart of the majority of histories that one
finds in popular texts, such as brief summaries, online resources and at the conclusion of
favorable writings on the Wobblies’ heyday. The following excerpts from online encyclopedias
and major texts on the IWW highlight this dominant explanation:
-

Federal and state governments moved to suppress the organization, imprisoning
hundreds of Wobblies, passing criminal syndicalism laws that made membership a
crime. The IWW survived and is active today, but never regained the momentum of
its early years.30

-

The region's logging then came under the control of the U.S. Army… Wartime
sedition laws and their enforcement by the FBI, Military Intelligence, and police ‘red

30

Gregory, James and Conor Casey, The IWW History Project (University of Washington, 2019) Web.
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squads’ also left the IWW much diminished. The IWW never recovered and
Communist groups eclipsed it after the war.31
-

In the postwar years, the IWW underwent further scrutiny and prosecution by local
officials responding to widespread antiradical sentiments. By 1925 membership in the
IWW had dwindled to insignificance.32

While not a single figure denies the significance of state repression on the IWW, this group of
authors places it at the forefront. They are also joined by modern historians who study political
repression and the IWW generally, as well as former Wobblies who have reflected on the
decline. Though these narratives have all been published since the late 1970s and are the
minority in numerical terms of works produced on the topic, their arguments occupy the
dominant position in popular media where the public will most readily find information regarding
the movement, especially online.
A brief review of key scholars within this group may help to understand the origins and
implications of the emphasis on repression. Adam Hodges, who wrote in the Oregon
Encyclopedia entry (2018) that business and state repression “left the IWW much diminished,”
sits among the youngest modern historians writing on the topic. Currently an Associate
Professor in the Human Sciences and History Department at the University of Houston, Hodges
writes on U.S. labor history of the twentieth century, often examining methods of political
suppression against the working class during World War One and the Red Scare.33 Though his
analysis of the decline of the IWW does not extend beyond the encyclopedia entry, he
articulates the common features of his colleagues in a concise way, revealing how his views

Adam Hodges, “The Industrial Workers of the World,” Oregon Encyclopedia (2018).
Kathleen Scheetz, “Industrial Workers of the World,” Encyclopedia Britannica (2019).
33
Other works of Adam J. Hodges include The Industrial Workers of the World and the Oregon Packing
Company Strike of July 1913, Master’s Thesis (Portland State University, Dept. of History, 1996);
"Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: The Portland Soviet and the Emergence of American Communism,
1918-1920," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 98, No. 3 (2007); World War I and Urban Order: The Local
Class Politics of National Mobilization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
31
32
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may be shaped by the context in which he focuses on the impacts of repression on American
labor.
Robert Goldstein is one of the leading historians within the field of political repression in
the United States and Europe, and has applied this research to the IWW. As a former professor
at the University of Michigan and Oakland University, Goldstein has written numerous texts on
censorship, repression, and violence by the state against political groups and labor
organizations.34 In one of his well-known books, Political Repression in Modern America: From
1870 to the Present ( 1978), he accounts for the various ways in which the U.S. government
sought to crush radical movements, often violating basic legal and democratic rights. The
impacts of these state efforts on labor organizations were deadly, he argues, and the Wobblies
were irreparably damaged by the violence waged against them. “The attack of the federal and
local governments, along with those of vigilantes,” Goldstein states, “totally disrupted the IWW
leadership, dispersed its membership, and destroyed IWW locals.”35 Repeatedly emphasizing
that its local unions were obliterated as a direct consequence of the state’s repressive
mechanisms, he presents the view that the Wobblies did their best but were no match for the
powerful government forces that wanted them dead. Goldstein is not an expert on the general
history of the Wobblies, but his work appears vital to understanding the basic assumptions and
conclusions that IWW historians employed in similar analyses of the decline.
Several non-academic authors worked to compile an oral history anthology, titled
Solidarity Forever (1985), which is recognized as a helpful collection of first-hand accounts by
former Wobblies. Edited by the radical writers and artists Dan Georgakas, Steven Bird, and
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Deborah Shaffer, the collections provide a look into how the emphasis on state repression
developed in the thought of members as they dealt with its daily consequences. The authors
devote an entire chapter to “Continued Repression and Decline”, in which former members
recount how they grappled with changing conditions before and after 1924.36 While the stories of
former Wobblies vary in their interpretations of the causes of the collapse, often including
organizational and political matters, there is a strong grounding of their stories in the arrests and
raids that many of them endured first hand. “We still had IWW members conducting strikes, but
the movement made from 1910 to 1920 had been destroyed,” Nicolaas Steelink recounted, “We
didn’t have enough workers to carry on… Each time we seemed about to go ahead, another
wave of repression hit us. We just declined.”37
Some historians extend the category of state repression to include cultural backlash of
middle-class elements and hostile attitudes of the media and politicians, which aimed to alienate
the Wobblies from public acceptance. John Townsend carried out the most thorough work of
this cultural perspective, though he is not the only scholar to do so.38 With little information
known about his personal or educational background, Townsend is well-known among the IWW
historical community for his collection of media opposing the movement throughout its life in
Running the Gauntlet: Cultural Sources of Violence against the IWW ( 1986).39 Drawing upon
newspapers, political speeches, official statements and correspondence, Townsend examines
how general fears within the public created the environment for violent state repression to
proceed without mass opposition. He specifically looks at the reactions of three key layers of
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affluent American society--big business with their defense of profitability, the middle class with
their commitment to American social values, and the U.S. government with their fear of strikes,
progressive movements and revolution. “Wartime hysteria,” Townsend asserts, “traded on by a
government anxious to mobilize the country for the war effort, ensured the destruction of the
IWW” in a process that only intensified following the conclusion of the war.40 According to this
perspective, the fears within upper strata of society laid the basis for the official description of
the IWW as a band of violent agitators out to destroy America, lending justification to repressive
measures that crushed it. Further, Townsend explains that the explicit defense of the United
States in wartime was joined by conservative opposition to the Wobblies’ birth control advocacy,
“free love”, ethnic pluralism, and other socially liberal issues. The IWW could easily be turned
into a scapegoat by sections of the privileged classes, who saw in their radical unionism the
antithesis of all the ethical, economic and social norms of American capitalism.
The work carried out by this group of scholars offers valuable contributions to the history
of the IWW by documenting political repression carried out by the United States government.
However, there are limitations and implications in these works which must be explored. First,
many of these works offer only a brief examination of the decline period, either adding a quick
conclusion at the end of a long pre-1917 historical piece, or including the IWW within a broader
analysis of state repression. Second, given that all of the authors wrote these texts in the last
fifty years, they formed their arguments as the activity, organizations, and social conditions of
the working class were suppressed. Without being conscious of the period in which they carried
out their research, they may have been influenced by the emergence of conservative economic
policy, anti-union fervor, and declining levels of strike activity that began in the late 1970s, which
created the appearance of the victory of the capitalist state over the working class. Third, these
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authors focus almost exclusively on the oppressive factors external to the organization, implying
that the internal conditions were subordinate to those factors and out of members’ control. The
logical conclusion of such a focus is that the fate of the IWW--or any political or labor movement
for that matter--rests in the hands of those in power, and there is hardly a strategy to overcome
the inevitable crackdown pursued by a fearful state. Is such a pessimistic, fatalistic proposition
valid? If so, what is the point of a radical movement from below? If not, what could the IWW
membership have done to avoid its collapse? What could be said of organizations in the U.S.
and internationally that have survived state repression? While all historians agree that the
repression carried out by the U.S. government placed a huge burden on the organization, the
majority seem to consider it a heavy pressure that exacerbated, but did not fundamentally
cause, the rifts that tore the organization apart.

Perspectives on Organizational Weaknesses: The Pessimistic Majority
Of all the histories produced regarding the Wobblies in decline, those that emphasized
the internal organizational failures were among the first and most highly regarded works. John
Gambs, a young scholar at Columbia University intrigued with radical social movements, took
the first attempt at accounting for the IWW’s collapse with a dissertation titled The Decline of the
IWW (1932).41 His work laid the foundation for many preceding endeavors, with his name cited
in every significant reflection on the decline. In the socially radical period of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, Leland Robinson and Melvyn Dubofsky reworked Gambs’ general perspective with
a wealth of new material. Robinson wrote the only other comprehensive work on the decline,
Social Movement Organizations in Decline: A Case Study of the IWW (1973),42 and Dubofsky
produced one of the most authoritative books on the IWW, We Shall Be All: A History of the

41
42

Gambs, The Decline of the I.W.W.
Robinson, Social Movement Organizations in Decline.

20
Industrial Workers of the World (1967, 1993), with two chapters devoted to its decline.43 These
writers do not offer a detailed assessment of political perspectives in flux, or their relationship to
a changing external environment. Rather, they show how political tensions impacted the
day-to-day work of the movement, through the lens of individual actors, social and financial
pressures, and strategic planning issues. By looking at these internal controversies, the authors
seek to find connections between the trajectory of the IWW with social movements and political
organizations in general.
The dissertation produced by John Gambs was the first comprehensive assessment of
the IWW after it had collapsed, openly intended to be a continuation of an earlier overview by
Paul Brissenden.44 Carrying out historical work with a generalized interest in politics and
revolution, Gambs acknowledges that his engagement with the IWW is contingent on whether it
“throws light on social change.”45 He mostly focused on the period between 1917 and 1924,
during which the basic splits of leadership occurred, aiming to surface these post-1917 events in
a comprehensive form for the first time while reviewing their implications for the following years.
Included in the dissertation are vast quantities of primary material on public opinion, the
response of the IWW to repression, the internationalism promoted by the Communist
movement, the 1924 convention, union struggles in the 1920s, education and organization, and
the American labor movement as a whole. Thus, the text serves a greater function as a
collection of primary documents and research, rather than as a thorough analysis of the forces
driving events. Due to the constraints of a historiographical focus, I am not able to incorporate
the majority of his research into my analysis. However, the insights are significant in that they
constitute the first official historical narrative about the collapse independent of the IWW.
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Although pointing to the importance of state repression, strategic debate, and difficulties
as a union, he concludes that the fundamental factor at work was the movement’s lack of
flexibility to adapt to changing conditions:
The I.W.W. need not grow in size to be heard from again; it does not need to engage in
spectacular activities. It must, however, have able leaders and intelligent members.
These it lacks today… One of the prime tests of intelligence is the ability to grow and
develop; to meet the problems of a changing environment. The I.W.W. is willing to
change the world, but it is not willing to change itself. Members with constructive
suggestions for change and adaptation to post-war conditions are not encouraged to
express their opinions. Inflexible, dogmatic, fatalistic--that is the I.W.W. today.46

Thus, leaders and members, the living organizational components, were at the heart of the
IWW’s failure to develop its strength and perspectives in the tumultuous period that followed
1917. State repression surely dealt its blows to the organizational apparatus, but the IWW
contained too great of built-in weaknesses to overcome those blows. If the organization were to
survive, Gambs argues, it would have to become more flexible, adaptive and eager to renew its
forces to meet the challenges of the day.
In 1973, Leland Robinson carried out the first comprehensive analysis of the decline of
the movement since Gambs, using his dissertation on the IWW as a case study of social
movements in decline, a prelude to several other works on international social, political, and
religious sociology. In contrast to the other historians, Robinson reflects “New Age” humanist
thinking regarding conflict resolution and interpersonal relations within communities, an
emphasis that re-emerged as he later pursued Eastern religious studies. Robinson aligns
himself with an organizational approach to the decline of social movements, by which historians
uncover how groups respond internally to the inevitable changes that take place in society. He
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claimed that such a perspective was missing from political and social movement history. The
main issues he explores are financial problems after 1924,47 aggravated by a hostility to
fundraising and “capitalist” business affairs such as advertising.48 These liabilities, he contends,
resulted in “pressures tending to cause them to neglect and forsake their goals,” compounded
by internal divisions that made it impossible to wage a genuine defense of the organization.49
Coming from a background of sociology rather than social history, Robinson examines
the movement as a network of individuals and groups that operated within binary tensions of a
subjective character, such as change versus stability, or “pure” versus mainstream ideologies.
“The mere fact that a movement organization is in decline does not relegate it to a fixed pattern
of transformation,” Robinson writes. “The dynamics of movement organizations may be seen as
the result of the continuous interaction of various pressures for change and pressures for
stability.”50 Rather than portraying the decline as a thread of practical-strategic errors sparked by
external pressures, as Gambs and Dubofsky had, Robinson sees these failures through a
humanistic light where individual actors worked under general goals that were simply too difficult
to achieve:
The pressures and counter-pressures can all be traced to ‘people doing things together.’
They are the results of such things as the members of declining and declined movement
organizations trying to solve concrete problems of maintaining their organization, trying to
work toward goals which they hold in common, trying to realize what they regard as
organizational values, trying to deal with the effects of competing organizations and
ideologies, trying to deal with the opinions of what are considered relevant groups of
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non-members, trying to maintain member enthusiasm and commitment, reacting to the
changing composition of the organization’s membership and so forth.51

Nevertheless, there seems to be a disconnect between the immense amount of historical
content contained in Robinson’s dissertation and the value of the conclusions offered, given
their implications. Was it plausible to suggest that the IWW’s issues were rooted in the failure to
achieve interpersonal unity? What could they have done differently? Should the Wobblies have
attracted “better” individuals? Or engaged in interpersonal conflict resolution training? The
demand to produce a cohesive organization in which everyone got along seems more a
suggestion in hindsight from the New Age activism of Robinson than an assessment of an
organization existing in a different historical period with different cultural and political lenses.
Further, the suggestion does little to connect the internal issues with the external context that
gave rise to the issues in the first place, connections which are strongly presented in the other
works.
Melvyn Dubofsky is among the leading historians of the IWW, author of the authoritative
text, We Shall Be All. As a long-time professor at Binghamton University, SUNY, Dubofsky
studies U.S. labor and twentieth century history from a perspective generally favoring political
and organizational efforts of the working class. He has written the biographies of former
president of the United Mine Workers of America John L. Lewis and “Big Bill” Haywood of the
Wobblies, as well as other labor-related histories.52 Dubofsky approaches the decline of the
IWW with a sympathetic intrigue, but does not accept the ultimate cause of decline to be state
repression. He disagrees with the arguments that make fundamental the element of state
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repression, which incorrectly emphasize “external repression” above “internal inadequacies.”53
In his analysis, he critiques the internal response of the movement to all types of issues,
whether they be strictly organizational, or arising from state repression and programmatic
disagreements.
In terms of the strictly organizational, Dubofsky emphasizes the impact of the “leadership
drain” that was “simply too great a handicap for an organization as i nherently weak as the IWW”
that “few organizations could have survived.”54 In the lead-up to the 1924 convention that
officially split the movement, the union found itself without any of the firm and experienced “old
guard”, leading it to prioritize improvements for its members over revolutionary commitments.55
The abandonment of revolutionary commitments weakened the organization by eroding the
foundations that offered cohesion for members of diverse views, as well as the militancy that
distinguished the IWW from other unions. In the process of being uprooted from their common
program and unconsciously immersed in day-to-day tasks, serious problems came to the fore.
Leaders tended to neglect crucial needs like finances, including the iconic Haywood when he
was released from prison. While legal defense campaigns to save “class war prisoners”
preoccupied much of the leadership’s time, they mostly failed to combat the hardlined
repression by the U.S. government. Torn over how to wage a defense of their members while
keeping their principles, the presidential offers in 1922 and 1923 exacerbated the strategic
fissure emerging from within. When President Coolidge commuted the sentences of all
remaining wartime prisoners in December 1923, an organization-wide distrust of released
members arose due to their alleged betrayal of defending the movement’s legality.
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Without strong leadership or cohesion, the union did not hold national conventions as
often and left the administrative side of the organization in chaos. Dubofsky suggests that, due
to these deficiencies in the midst of a repressive crackdown, the organization struggled with the
following key issues: “The status of its political prisoners, its relationship with the Communist
party at home and the Comintern abroad, and the distribution of power within the organization
between centralists and decentralists, industrial unionists and anarchists.”56 These issues,
although highly political, are addressed more from a tactical standpoint. Contrary to historians
who place primacy on the political questions over the organizational features, Dubofsky
emphasizes that “disagreements over communism [for example] further aggravated the IWW’s
internal disorders,” listing a series of interpersonal reflections of the broader political and
strategic divisions.57
On the question of union relations, Dubofsky stresses the isolation that the IWW had dug
itself into by embarking on a road independent of post-war changes that brought a new wave of
union and political affiliations. Company-tied unionism became more mainstream due to the
ability of American corporations, with the help of the government and weakening AFL, to meet
the basic demands of workers for higher wages, eight-hour work days, and better conditions, a
general pattern that varied by industry. Dubofsky pointed out several examples to clarify the
differences across occupations and regions. Often times, the whole structure of industries
changed, as in agricultural occupations, where the demand for labor decreased with the mass
introduction of the combine, while simultaneously the migratory harvesters that were once a
pillar of the IWW turned more into family men that “travelled as far and as often as their battered
secondhand cars carried them.”58 In these cases, the IWW had difficulty keeping up with
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structural changes. Other industries remained relatively similar to the wartime period, like those
based on waterfronts and ports, yet still the IWW fell into isolation. In one example that
highlights the movement’s challenges, the Marine Transport Workers’ Industrial Union in
Philadelphia, founded as an IWW organization in 1913, decided to switch affiliations to the AFL
after the Wobblies’ national leadership challenged their ability to set local dues higher than
constitutional limits. Dubofsky argues that these feuds arose from pressure to strengthen the
movement’s position as a labor group in the midst of competition, a task which could not be
achieved without overcoming its weak points.
Internal debates turned into feuds, with none of the existing leaders willing or capable to
carry out the necessary organizational changes that could have helped them retain high
membership numbers. Leaders failed to initiate necessary measures at a time when decisions
regarding strategy and perspective were critical to the IWW’s positioning within working class
struggles. However, Dubofsky writes, “given the internal deficiencies of the IWW, the aspirations
of most of its members during the organization’s heyday, and the dynamics of American
capitalism, the Wobblies’ attempt to transform American workers into a revolutionary vanguard
was doomed to failure.”59 Even during the IWW’s best three years during World War One, he
contends it faced trouble maintaining union benefits as labor-management relations changed,
lost all its best leaders from repression, pursued mostly-failed defense campaigns, endured
intense conflict over strategy and policy, and thereby failed to meet the challenges of the
Bolshevik Revolution and state repression. “It is remarkable that the organization survived at
all,” he concludes, claiming that the combination of these issues would have broken most other
organizations.60
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Dubofsky suggests that in order to retain their influence as a labor movement, given that
becoming a communist or anarchist movement was not an option after 1922, they would have
had to do “what the CIO did.”61 This means establishing more official industrial unions, accepting
more long-term and bureaucratic positions, and engaging in collective bargaining. However, he
begs the question, if these changes had been implemented and the organization survived well
into the radical mainstream of the 1920s and 30s, “what would have remained of its original
purpose?”62 Thus, Dubofsky offers a pessimistic approach to the decline of the IWW, seeing the
original project as one that could only thrive in a prior period and lacked the qualities to change
the movement in alignment with the organizational and programmatic needs of workers during
the 1920s.

Perspectives on Political Strategy and Program
The majority of scholarship and writing in the field regard state repression as a brutal
pressure which exacerbated the movement’s many issues, related to either internal organization
or political and programmatic perspective. The latter group consists of a handful of authors,
mostly modern historians,63 who focused on the divide within the IWW arising from tensions
between conservative unionism, industrial syndicalism, and radical politics like communism and
anarchism that emerged with more strength after the Russian Revolution in October 1917.
Interestingly, the first figure who shared this perspective wrote decades before the other
two historians. James P. Cannon was a former Wobbly who fled in the post-1917 crisis for
communism and later led the American Trotskyist movement for decades after 1928. Cannon
wrote an essay for the Fourth International m
 agazine (1955) on the topic of the IWW collapse
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for the purpose of educating members of his party, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), as well
as workers with which they were regularly engaged.64 As someone who had acquired a more
concrete political orientation since he left the Wobblies, Cannon aimed to explain his former
movement’s collapse as a product of unresolved political issues arising from the Bolshevik
Revolution and First World War. These major world events, he argued, were at the heart of the
infamous 1924 split in the IWW, despite the various immediate concerns which dominated the
tense atmosphere during the convention. It was during this convention that the caps burst off all
simmering conflicts, regarding the heavy state suppression it experienced and the future path
for the struggling organization.
Coming from a Marxist theoretical background, Cannon rejects the common obsession
over key figures and internal conflicts, instead placing greater emphasis on the objective
dynamics of world politics, competing class interests, and how these impact revolutionary
movements. Thus, like the other authors, he agrees that the IWW was pushed to the fringes,
perhaps because of an inherent weakness within anarchist politics (or its lack of politics to be
more precise), relative to other leftist tendencies. With the majority of the Wobbly leadership
denouncing the “workers’ state” after initial support, the organization ceded influence to the
Communist Party, Cannon wrote, and was not strong enough to endure the isolation, repression
and splits which it experienced. Contrary to the fixed mindsets of the majority of the IWW, the
defense campaign would not save the organization from repression and collapse, but rather the
development of political perspectives on major questions a revolutionary organization must
comprehend, such as the nature of the Soviet Union, class struggle, socialism and communism.
While leading members initially attempted to study these issues and develop the program of the
IWW according to their implications, among them Haywood and Cannon, the bulk of the “old
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guard” did not change their anti-political ways and rejected the struggle for workers’ state power.
“The big majority, after several years of wavering, went the other way [from support for the
Russian Revolution]. That sealed the doom of the IWW, ” Cannon asserts. “Its tragic failure to
look, listen and learn from the two great events condemned it to defeat and decay.”65
Even with this sharp critique of the organization’s decisions, Cannon does not hold bitter
resentment toward the syndicalist and anarchist perspectives, nor does he assign a fatalistic
character to the movement’s eventual collapse. In fact, the Trotskyist leader deemed the IWW
the “most militant, the most revolutionary section of the workers’ vanguard in this country,” and
one that was “much nearer to Lenin’s conception of a party of professional revolutionists than
any other organization calling itself a party at that time.”66 Thus, to Cannon, the collapse of the
IWW was a “historical miscarriage which might have been prevented” if there had been a
stronger Communist leadership, deeper discussions on the issues within the membership, and a
concerted effort to win over leaders. Although this recommendation to develop a more firm
strategy is shared by all of scholars who focus on the political issues, Cannon is the only one
who advocates a Communist trajectory. The essay also stands out as one of the only
non-academic pieces, allowing a more open disclosure of political leanings. The author does not
hide that he operated within the Communist movement after the decisive split from the IWW, nor
that he used the essay for the purpose of educating his party and workers coming into the
movement in the Cold War period of the 1950s.
Writing over half a century after the Wobbly-turned-Trotskyist, Kenyon Zimmer (2009)
also accounts for the impacts of the Bolshevik Revolution on the development of the American
anarchist movement, of which the IWW was an overlapping part. However, he takes an
approach that is much more sympathetic to anarchism, while hostile to socialism and
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communism. Zimmer is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas, Arlington
with research interests in the history of anarchism, syndicalism and immigration. As a modern
labor historian, he draws upon an immense amount of history pertaining to anti-communism in
the United States, contributing to perspectives which regained popularity after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991.
While the Industrial Workers of the World was not a fundamentally anarchist
organization, its cross of industrial unionism and revolutionary syndicalism attracted many
anarchist supporters. Anarchism had deep ties to the IWW on an organizational and political
level, especially in the heat of the Russian events in 1917. “American anarchism entered into an
irresolvable crisis after 1917,” writes Zimmer, with their lodging of antagonisms against both
American capitalism and the Soviet state, which were viewed as repressive. This left the
movement “increasingly marginalized and ineffectual.”67 Although sympathetic to anarchism,
Zimmer places ultimate blame for the collapse on the movement’s failure to develop an effective
program independent of both capitalism and communism. He supports this point with a fairly
comprehensive analysis of the roots of the anti-communism within the IWW.
According to Zimmer, the relationship of anarchism and Bolshevism was generally
positive in the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. Russian-American anarchists
were allowed to return to their home country when the Soviets gained control, and thousands
took advantage of the opportunity. Emma Goldman, one of the more famous Russian-American
anarchists who returned from a visit, reported that they “left this country with the determination
to help the Bolsheviki.” Fellow anarchist Alexander Berkman praised the Bolsheviks as “the
expression of the most fundamental longing of the human soul that demands fullest individual
liberty.”68 In fact, many non-Russian American anarchists attempted to join the Red Guard
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workers’ army, though their goals were hampered by the U.S. government’s ban on travel to the
Soviet Union.
However, as the Civil War intensified within Russia, with the Bolshevik Red Army fighting
off the White Army between 1918 and 1922, anarchists were not granted the political autonomy
they had initially anticipated when their anti-Bolshevik and anti-statist expressions were shut
down by Soviet authorities. From 1917 through the early 1920s, anarchists in the United States
disagreed on how to approach the Soviet Union. In the socialist state they saw, on the one
hand, a successful revolutionary road, and on the other, a potential dead-end of state
repression that parallelled capitalism. “Amid this confusion, repression, and lack of information,
wishful thinking contributed much to initial anarchist impressions of Bolshevism,” writes Zimmer.
69

Emma Goldman released My Disillusionment in Russia i n 1923, a reflection on the repression

faced by anarchists in the Soviet Union, which had a marked impact on the anarchist and other
anti-Bolshevik layers within the IWW in the lead up to the 1924 split.70 The confusion finally hit a
turning point when ACLU founder Roger Baldwin and other liberals published Letters from
Russian Prisons i n 1925, detailing the conditions that anti-Bolshevik political figures faced
during the period of “War Communism”, notably just one year after the 1924 IWW convention.
Zimmer notes the direct conflict within the IWW over the question of communist politics.
The newly-founded Communist International made a concerted effort to bring the IWW into the
international movement, especially through sympathetic Wobbly Harrison George.71 Though the
first referendum to join the Comintern was rejected by IWW representatives in 1918, the
General Executive Board made several gestures in support of the Bolshevik state. It removed
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the anarcho-syndicalist editor of its One Big Union Monthly for criticizing the Bolsheviks,
suspended Philadelphia’s Marine Transport Workers Local 8 for loading munitions that
Communist sources alleged were to be used against the Red Army, and accepted an invitation
to the founding convention of the Communist Red International of Labor Unions (RILU) in
Moscow in 1919.”72 Many members also retained pro-Bolshevik leanings following the IWW
convention in 1924, roughly 2,000 Wobblies affiliated with one of the parties in the American
communist movement. Eventually, writes Zimmer, “neither the Communists nor the anarchists
had carried the IWW, which was itself decimated in the contest.”73 He attributes the IWW’s
indecisive path to its “fear of exacerbating its internal divisions, reluctance to explicitly link itself
to anarchism, and its own ambitions of becoming an international labor body.”74
Zimmer repeats Cannon’s arguments about politics as fundamental to the IWW split and
collapse, but from the opposite position. In other words, the anarchist criticisms of the Soviets
within the IWW were justified and nuanced, but their indecision in moving into one of the fixed
anti-Bolshevik camps--conservative trade unionism or anarchism--became their fatal error. Also,
while Zimmer takes the position that U.S. state repression placed significant pressures on the
IWW, he expands that position to include repression by communists. Zimmer’s perspective on
the IWW’s failure to attach itself to a coherent political banner, therefore, places the situation
within the context created by both the October Revolution and the triumph of American
capitalism.
Finally, Robert Goldberg provides a concise overview of the IWW’s early history and
especially its decline as a relatively modern professional historian with a broad interest in social
movement history. Due to this background, he offers an abbreviated perspective on the political
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roots of the IWW’s decline as one chapter in his larger book Grassroots Resistance: Social
Movements in Twentieth Century America, which examines a range of organizations and
movements as ideologically diverse as the Ku Klux Klan and Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee. In the chapter “One Big Union: The Industrial Workers of the World”, Goldberg
outlines perspectives that overlap heavily with Zimmer, but without the same openly
pro-anarchist positions. Like Zimmer and Cannon, he emphasizes the tension that communism
posed to the industrial syndicalist organization, concluding with a drastic 10 to 20 percent of
Wobblies joining the Communist Party after the 1924 convention. Wobblies “scorned
[Communist] members as politicians and cited their opposition to armed insurrection and the
seizure of power by force,” writes Goldberg. “They also denounced the foreign control of the
movement, its stress on bureaucracy, and an authoritarianism that subjugated individualism to
the party line.”75 The opportunist maneuvers and anti-communist position of the IWW majority
pushed it out of the mainstream of radical politics for the remainder of its life. When faced with
state repression and inexperienced leadership, a coherent political perspective that united its
strongest remaining leaders, expanded its base of support within broader layers of the working
class, and guided conscious and organized activity in the midst of drastic historical changes was
essential. However, this did not occur.
Zimmer and Goldberg essentially put forward the same argument, that the anarchist and
syndicalist base of the IWW generated a hostility to communism while the communist movement
gained a huge following after the October Revolution. This fueled sharp internal conflicts over
the direction of the movement and shifted its external relations from mass politics to fringe
radicalism. While Cannon also examines the split between anarchism and communism, he does
so with a greater emphasis on class struggle, revolution, state power, and the lessons of the
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Russian Revolution. He identifies communism as the emerging “radical mainstream” in
American politics, and in fact world politics, pushing the anarchistic and anti-communist
elements within the IWW onto the fringes. While he does not have nearly the same level of
historical background on the roots of anti-communist sentiments within the IWW as Zimmer,
they share the same approach only with opposed conclusions specific to their respective
political sympathies.

Conclusion: Toward a Critical and Comprehensive Narrative
By assimilating new material and revisiting prior work, each author contributed to the
historical understanding of why the Industrial Workers of the World declined after 1917. I have
reviewed notable works that represent the major arguments within the broader body of
literature, though many more scholarly articles, books, movies and even music on the subject
exist beyond the scope of my project. In bringing these histories into communication with one
another and suggesting their potential origins, certain implications have emerged regarding the
challenges and potential successes for unions and social movements.
The narratives that emphasize state repression offer the most fatalistic of conclusions.
Whatever internal features the Wobblies could consciously affect, these authors argue that the
counterrevolutionary forces of the state, corporate interests, and the conservative elements of
the middle class held the power to crush whatever organization they choose. One must ask
these authors, what could be said of organizations that did survive state repression, in the
United States and internationally? Further, if the state always wins, what is the purpose of
building left-wing social and labor movements in the first place? Given that these authors
exclusively wrote these narratives during or after the right-wing turn in mainstream politics in the
1970s,

their

pessimistic

view

of radical social movements surviving repression is
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understandable. However, the scholars of this “pessimistic minority” conducted their work after
prior historians argued the opposite by exploring in detail how the Wobblies may have
responded poorly to external conditions. The work of this minority is valuable in what information
they offer the historical community, but its implications are limited, especially for a new
generation of workers and political activists who may desire advice on how best to handle the
internal and programmatic conditions of their own movements.
Although rooted in an understanding that state repression and cultural backlash
contributed to the difficult conditions in which the IWW operated, the historical works that
emphasize internal organizational weaknesses and programmatic strategy offer more
compelling arguments that often intersect with each other. Authors who stress internal
weaknesses express strong criticism of the IWW, but have published some of the most
comprehensive and highly-regarded analyses of the organization’s life and death, focusing on
the reactions of its members and leaders to the conditions imposed upon it. While never taking
a fatalistic approach, these scholars often argue that the weakened membership and
decentralized structure of the Wobblies made their collapse inevitable. I refer to this group as
the “pessimistic majority,” since they consist of influential scholars who label the major
transformation necessary for the IWW’s survival a near-impossible project. Further, while the
union could have taken steps to drastically change and improve itself in order to meet the
challenges of a changing world, one can only speculate as to the outcomes of potential
solutions. As Melvyn Dubofsky poses, the Wobblies would have had to revoke many of their
foundational anarchistic and syndicalist tenets if they were to pursue more centralized
organization, standard trade unionism, or political engagement, meaning they wouldn’t remain
Wobblies at all.
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Similarly, the authors who stress political and programmatic questions recognize that the
Wobblies had to turn to a more defined strategic camp, as the pressures of the Bolshevik
Revolution and post-war changes exacerbated long-standing conflicts and disagreements.
Despite the diversity of the authors’ political backgrounds--with Cannon suggesting a communist
turn, Zimmer and Goldberg suggesting either an anarchist or trade unionist turn--they agree with
the fundamental point that the IWW had to figure out what they were fighting for and where they
were headed. Again, speculative questions remain, as it is impossible to know whether the IWW
would have survived if it turned toward anarchism, communism, or standard trade unionism.
Additionally, by restricting their movement to a well-defined program, they likely would have
been forced to sacrifice the anti-political, pluralistic and pragmatic aspects of their earlier life,
qualities that distinguished the IWW from all other unions and social movements. For example,
should the Wobblies have embarked upon a more standard industrial unionist road in the 1920s,
regaining traction and members, they would have confronted the decision to join the CIO after
1935, where the IWW would find itself estranged from communist workers and the large-scale
actions carried out in whole industries.76
While the speculative questions may never be answered, they reveal the strengths of the
authors who investigated the response of the IWW in terms of organizational and programmatic
issues, in particular the possibility of the Wobblies successfully overcoming repression. What
was necessary and lacking at the time was a reorientation of the movement on a path that
aligned with their intended goals and the reality of a changing external world. Organizational
elements cannot be seen as entirely separate from the political issues, as the factional infighting
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and other stressors grew out of or were made more severe by the tensions between
programmatic groupings. However, political and programmatic questions seem to be more
essential than the organizational problems, since they lay the primary basis for organizational
matters to be dealt with. How can financial difficulties, leadership weaknesses and interpersonal
difficulties be resolved if the movement does not have a common program that its members
democratically support? Thus, I encourage future historical research and mainstream sources
on the IWW’s decline to embrace a new historical narrative, which takes a critical approach to
the exclusive blame on state repression while accounting for the centrality of political and
related organizational problems. Such an approach may open the path for critical and
comprehensive analyses of the IWW, as well as social movements in general.
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